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Abstract
Many believe that the deep question of “why is there something rather than nothing?” is 
unanswerable.  The  universe  just  is and  no  further  explanation  for  its  existence  is 
possible. In this paper I explain why this question must have an answer, and why that 
answer must establish that physical existence is inescapable and necessary. Based on the 
conclusion that if the universe is eternal rather than having a beginning some finite time 
in the past, the universe has to exist rather than not because its possible non-existence is 
never an option, such an explanation is put forward. As a logical extension of only an  
eternal universe being capable of providing an answer to the question of why there is 
something rather  than  nothing,  the  argument  necessitates  that  the  universe  must  be 
eternal. The consequences of this conclusion for cosmology are then briefly discussed.
1.  Introduction 
Why is there something rather than nothing? As Stephen Hawking put it, “What is it that 
breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?…Why does 
the universe go to all the bother of existing?”2 Since this question was first posed as 
such by Gottfried Leibniz in 1697 [1], it has often been termed the ultimate question. 
Martin Heidegger called it “the first of all questions,”3 the British astrophysicist A.C.B 
Lovell observed that it raised problems that could “tear the individual's mind asunder,”4 
while  Charles Darwin deemed it  “beyond the scope of man’s intellect.”5 Despite its 
standing  as  a  problem,  one  Adolf  Grünbaum has  termed  the  primordial  existential 
question  (PEQ)  [2],  it  has  attracted  comparatively  little  attention  from  modern 
philosophers or physicists. This is no doubt at least partly due to it being viewed by 
many as  being  unanswerable,  whether  due  to  being  seen  as  unfathomable,  or  as  a 
pseudo-problem that does not stack up as a valid question in the first place. Due to its 
apparent  unanswerability by conventional  means,  theists  have claimed that  the  only 
other possible explanation is the creation of all physical existence by God [3]. However,  
not only do I think it a genuine problem, but also that it must have a logical, naturalistic 
answer.
     After providing a summary of other approaches to tackling the question (placing a 
particular emphasis on ideas about quantum creation from nothing), in this paper I argue 
that such an answer is to be found through the conclusion that, contrast to a universe 
with a beginning a finite time in the past, only an eternal universe can possibly provide 
an answer to the PEQ, because at no stage during its eternal lifetime is its non-existence 
ever an option. I then argue that, because of this and an inescapable need for a necessary 
explanation for existence (contrast to a contingent one or no explanation), the universe 
must also be eternal. The implications of this conclusion for cosmology and theology 
are then discussed.   
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2.  Denying non-existence 
The  implicit  assumption  underlying  the  PEQ  is  that  the  existence  of  the  physical 
universe  is  contingent.  Things  may  have  been  different  and  the  universe  not  have 
existed. If one were able to reject this assumption, the conclusion that the universe must 
exist and could not have possibly done otherwise naturally follows; its existence would 
be necessary. Furthermore, because in order to answer the PEQ, we need an explanation 
as  to  why the  universe  exists  rather  than  not,  and by its  very nature,  a  contingent 
explanation  already  admits  the  possibility  of  the  universe  not  existing,  any  such 
explanation must fall short for it cannot tell us why non-existence was indeed not the 
case. As such, only an appeal to the necessary and non-contingent nature of existence 
can potentially provide a satisfactory explanation.6 
     From Parmenides onwards, denying that non-existence is possible has had a long and 
venerable history in philosophy, and in attempting to address the PEQ, and this is the 
approach that authors such as Armstrong [4], Lowe [5], and Rundle [6] have taken. 
However,  and while it  is  logically contradictory to  deny the existence of something 
because that “something” must exist for its existence to be denied, this only applies to 
the abstract “idea” of that something—something which does not physically exist. One 
can certainly assert without contradiction that a living unicorn does not physically exist, 
but that the idea of it exists in a non-physical, timeless, platonic sense. Furthermore, the 
possibility of the universe not actually physically existing—of there literally not being 
anything physical at all—does at least seem to be a coherent idea (even if, in modal 
logic terms, the idea of a “possible world” in which nothing exists is contradictory due 
to there not being anything existent to make such a possible world existent). After all, as 
Baldwin  [7]  and  Rodriguez-Pereyra  [8]  have  argued,  anything  that  one  may  argue 
remains  physically  existent  in  such  a  context  can  simply  then  have  its  existence 
subtracted.
     Contrast to Leibniz, who argued that non-existence was more simple and natural, and 
so required the existence of a necessary God to create a hugely complex and unlikely 
contingent physical existence [9], Van Inwagen has attempted to explain why there is 
something rather  than nothing by showing not  that  non-existence is  impossible,  but 
existence far more probable [10]. Because there are so many ways in which there could 
have  been  something,  but  only  one  in  which  there  is  nothing,  something  is  more 
probable.  Indeed,  given there  is  an  infinite  number  of  ways  there  could  have  been 
something,  but  only  one  in  which  there  is  nothing,  nothing,  while  not  strictly 
impossible, is maximally improbable. 
     A third approach, such as that of Max Tegmark [11] and Dean Rickles [12], is to  
argue that mathematical structures exist necessarily, and given that theoretical physics 
represents the physical universe as a mathematical structure, the physical universe exists 
necessarily as a consequence of mathematical structures necessarily existing. As Rickles 
argues:
Either existence is contingent or it is necessary. If it is contingent then there is no complete 
coherent account of existence. If it is necessary then we need a necessary structure to ground 
this fact. Mathematical structures are of this kind. If reality is mathematical then it must exist. 
Reality is mathematical (as evidenced by the effectiveness of mathematics in the sciences). 
6 This should not be confused with the question of why certain contingent physical things, such as rocks  
or people, exist rather than not, as these are separate questions and relate to the existence of particular 
things and not  existence itself.  Why people exist  rather  than not is  explainable causally by physics,  
biochemistry and evolution, while the existence of rocks is explainable causally by geology. As we will 
see shortly,  existence itself cannot be explained causally,  however,  because such an explanation will 
always leave the existence (rather than not) of the causal agent unexplained.  
Therefore, there is existence.
     However, and while it is arguably a different case for a non-physical, platonic reality,
7 the idea that physical reality is mathematical is extremely difficult, if not impossible to 
justify.  While many would accept that mathematical structures exist  necessarily in a 
platonic sense, and very few would deny the effectiveness of mathematical structures in 
describing and mapping the world, it can be argued that this is so simply because the 
world naturally has quantities, and mathematics is, by its nature, quantitative. Geometry 
corresponds  so  well  to  the  world  because  the  world  has  extent,  and  by default,  is 
geometric and has dimensions. Indeed, the only way in which the world wouldn’t be 
geometric is if it didn’t exist. Given this, it should then be no surprise that mathematics 
and mathematical structures correspond so well to Nature. Trying to assign physical 
reality to mathematical structures is also deeply problematic when one considers the 
contingency of specific physical structures that are said to correspond to necessarily 
existing mathematical structures. They are not the same entities.
    Finally, a fourth approach—or rather a group of related approaches—are scientific 
based ones, and all share the common claim that the universe spontaneously sprang into 
being from nothing (or at least, from something that is very close to nothing). This story 
started in 1973 when Edward P. Tyron published a paper asking if the universe could 
have arisen from a gigantic quantum fluctuation in a “pre-existing quantum vacuum” 
[13]. According to quantum theory, a vacuum is not actually an “empty space,” but is 
filled with a sea of “virtual” particles that randomly fluctuate into existence for very 
short periods before disappearing. In a way, they are able to do this by borrowing energy 
from the vacuum (in the form of “vacuum energy,” which is the lowest possible energy 
value a system can have and hypothesised to exist everywhere in the universe), and as 
long as these particles pay the energy back very quickly with their disappearance, they 
do not violate conservation laws. Despite their name, such particles are very real (if 
short lived), they can interact with each other, and with the Casimir effect [14], their 
existence  has  been  experimentally  confirmed.  Taking  this  a  step  further,  Tyron 
speculated that before the big bang, there could have been such a fluctuation, and with 
the  help  of  gravity  (which,  representing  negative  energy,  would  offset  the  positive 
energy of  the  fluctuation  so  that  energy was  still  conserved),  an  enormous  random 
fluctuation could have resulted in the birth of the universe.
    However, as Tyron's model was dependant on the existence of a background space,  
physicists quickly realized that this would then leave the existence of the background 
space  unexplained.  In  an  effort  to  get  around this  and do away with  anything pre-
existing,  in  1982  Alexander  Vilenkin  put  forward  a  model  based  on  another  well 
established aspect of quantum mechanics called quantum tunnelling. Although I will 
avoid going into details, in his model Vilenkin proposed that the universe was created 
by the  tail  of  its  wave  function  tunnelling  from truly nothing  [15].  Another  out  of 
nothing  idea,  which  shares  traits  of  both  Tyron's  and  Vilenkin's  proposals,  is 
occasionally said to be realizable simply through thinking about what the uncertainty 
principle  would  imply  about  nothingness  [16].  As  the  energy of  nothing  would  be 
exactly zero, and the uncertainty principle forbids such exacting knowledge of a system, 
“something”  in  the  form  quantum  fluctuations  would  inevitably  result.  In  both 
scenarios, the question of why there is something rather than nothing would presumably 
be answered by the laws of quantum mechanics. 
7 See, for example,  the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument.  H. Putnam, “Philosophy of Logic," 
reprinted in Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, 2nd edition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 323-357, (1979), and, W. V. Quine, “On What There Is", reprinted in 
From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 1-19, (1980).
      However, there would appear to be fatal flaws with both of these ideas. If we ask the 
question,  would the laws of  physics exist  in  the absence of  anything physical?,  the 
answer  here  is  clearly  no,  because  they  couldn't  physically  exist,  and  could  only 
possibly  do  so  in  a  platonic  sense.  Yet,  with  both  scenarios,  the  laws  of  quantum 
mechanics are somehow expected to exist in the absence of anything physical to cause 
quantum fluctuations or tunnelling. That is, the laws are said to be causal to both, and 
yet, in such a scenario, these laws couldn't exist. Indeed, by appealing to these models 
and assuming that non-physically existing, eternal, and timeless laws of physics could 
somehow bridge to the physical to cause fluctuations or tunnelling, a person is actually 
ascribing to a belief almost perfectly analogous to the idea that the universe was created 
by a non-physically existing, eternal, and timeless God, who is also somehow able to 
bridge this non-physical–physical gap to create a universe from nothing. Moreover, to 
say that  the  energy value  of  nothing  is  zero  is  something  of  a  misnomer,  because 
nothing couldn't have an energy value. It has no properties at all, and this is what makes 
it nothing.
     Of course, talking about the existence of the laws of physics being dependant on the 
physically existent is not entirely accurate, as, in a strict sense, the laws of physics don't 
actually exist;  they are simply models that we use to describe and make predictions 
about the world. Yet, the physical phenomena that they describe, such as magnetism, 
would appear to be very real, and in the same way that magnetism can be said to exist,  
so too can the laws of physics. Interestingly, some physicists have argued that the laws 
of physics may be not be fundamental at  all,  but instead emergent from some more 
fundamental process [17], or the result of a single overriding principle [18]. Although I 
find this a fascinating possibility, this would not help get spontaneous quantum creation 
from nothing off the hook, because such processes or principles could also not have any 
bearing in the absence of anything physical.
    Recently,  the physicists  Victor  Stenger  [18],  Frank Wilczek [19],  and Lawrence 
Krauss  [20],  have come up with some new arguments  as  to  why something should 
spontaneously appear  from nothing,  and posited that  physics  can indeed answer the 
question of why something exists rather than not.  These physicists all share the  claim 
that the existence of “something” would be inescapable, because true nothingness would 
be  perfectly  symmetric  (completely  invariant  under  transformation),  and  because 
symmetric systems tend to decay to less symmetric and more complex ones, nothing 
would be “unstable.” That is, through spontaneous symmetry breaking, “nothing” would 
tend to spontaneously decay into “something.” But there are some serious problems 
with this  idea too.  It  is  difficult  to see how nothing could be treated as symmetric, 
because nothing has no properties. For obvious reasons, one also couldn't run “nothing” 
through a transformation, while if one tried to, one would inevitably invoke a space. 
Some physicists would probably contend that one should be able to treat “nothing” just 
as anything else in physics—with a model—and that because one can hypothetically 
remove all matter, fields, and energy from a space, such an empty space or true vacuum 
should suffice as a model for nothing. But as this would still represent a space (a free 
space), one certainly wouldn't be dealing with “nothing.” Indeed, as a physical space is 
entirely dependant  on the existence of matter and energy,  physics—the study of the 
physically existent—could no more model “nothing” than a frog. 
     These three physicists (ones I should note I only hold respect for!) also  share the 
claim that a universe with total energy equal to zero (through the positive energy of 
matter and energy being conserved by gravity) supports the idea that the universe may 
have spontaneously appeared from nothing. However, as the total energy of a universe 
that didn't spontaneously appear from nothing would also be conserved and be zero, this 
doesn't really add up.
     In relation to physics being able to answer the question of why something exists 
rather than not, one can now see why a causal explanation for the question will never 
work, because it will always leave the existence of the causal agent unexplained. That 
is, unless an explanation for existence stops with a non-causal, necessary explanation, 
the question cannot be answered. In the case of spontaneous creation from nothing, the 
explanation for existence ends with the existence of symmetry principles or the laws of 
quantum mechanics, which are both said to be causal to “something.” But if we ask why 
these things would exist rather than not, considering that they could only have bearing 
in  relation  to  the  physically  existent,  we  are  left  grasping  at  thin  air  (or  nothing). 
Moreover,  if  we perhaps said that  our  universe  was randomly created from nothing 
(perhaps  from  one  of  countless  quantum  flucutations  out  of  nothing,  with  no 
background space or eternally pre-existing vacuum energy), with such a scenario, it is 
also possible that our universe may not have been created. As our universe would then 
represent  a  contingent  universe,  quantum creation from nothing couldn't  answer the 
question of why our universe exists rather than not (nor could it in respect to any other 
similarly contingent universe in a possible “multiverse.”) 
      If I had been asked one year ago what I believed the answer to the PEQ to be, I 
would have responded that, with no possible appeal to a causal explanation, the universe 
just is, and that I didn’t think any further answer was possible. However, I have since 
realized  that  the only reason I  would adhere  to  such a  “brute  force”  explanation  is 
simply because I couldn't imagine what a proper answer, even just in principle, might 
look like.  The following simple argument  with a logical  twist  is  the reason for this 
change of mind.  
3.  The Argument
i.  Only an eternally existing universe (defined as a state of affairs where at least one 
physical thing  always remains existent) can answer the question of why the universe 
exists rather than not, because the alternative—a universe with a beginning a finite time 
in  the  past—presents  the  possibility  that  the  universe  need  not  have  existed.  By 
implication, before the universe’s so-called beginning, there was nothing, and given that 
such a model posits that nothingness is possible, it  is also possible that this state of 
affairs may have continued, with such a universe not coming into being. Given that the 
existence  of  such  a  universe  is  contingent,  it  cannot  possibly  offer  a  satisfactory 
explanation as to the question of why the universe exists rather than not, because it 
cannot answer the secondary part of the question, “why not nothing?”.   
     On the other hand, however, at no time during its lifetime can an eternal universe not 
exist  because,  by  definition,  its  existence  is  eternal.  At  no  stage  during  its  eternal 
lifetime is its non-existence ever an option. As such, an eternal universe would exist 
rather than not because it is logically contradictory for an eternal universe to ever not 
exist. Its existence would be necessary (or in the context of temporal logic, true always), 
with it being impossible for this proposition to not be true under any condition. This is  
the key point of this paper, and although simple, historically it puzzlingly seems to have 
gone unnoticed.
ii. Because only an eternal universe (contrast to a finite  ex nihilo one) can answer the 
question of why the universe exists rather than not,  and this  question must have an 
answer, the universe must also be eternal.
iii. Because the universe must be eternal, the universe exists rather than not because at 
no stage during its eternal lifetime is its non-existence ever an option.
     In light of the above argument,8 it  becomes apparent that the faulty assumption 
underlying the PEQ has been in our not making a differentiation between an eternal 
universe and a universe with a beginning a finite time in the past,  and secondly,  in 
presupposing that the possibility of the universe not existing is a valid one. While it is 
for a universe with a beginning a finite time in the past, this is not the case with an 
eternal universe.
    It  might  be  objected  that  it  not  be  necessary  that  the  PEQ be  answerable  (as 
necessitated  by  ii.).  Could  it  be  that  there  is  no  explanation?  If  this  were  so,  the 
existence of the universe would be contingent (if it were necessary, there would be an 
explanation automatically given in order to ground its necessity). But contingency in 
this  sense  demands  an  explanation;  if  something  is  one  way but  could  have  been 
different,  there must  be  an explanation  for  its  being  that  way and not  different.  As 
outlined  earlier,  however,  in  the  case  of  existence  itself,  no  satisfactory  contingent 
explanation is possible due to such an explanation already admitting the possibility of 
the universe not existing, and so not being capable of telling us why non-existence was 
indeed not the case; with such a universe, there could be nothing rather than something. 
Consequently, and even though, of itself, there doesn't seem to be any other issue with 
the  existence  of  a  contingent  universe,  one  is  forced  into  the  need  for  a  necessary 
explanation for existence (and a necessarily existing universe) even if one wishes to 
claim that no satisfactory explanation (via a contingent universe) is required. 
     In relation to it being contradictory for an eternal universe to not exist at some point  
during its eternal lifetime, it might also be contended that the same could be said for 
anything. For example, “It is contradictory for an eternal rock to not exist at some point 
during its  eternal  lifetime.” Logically,  this  a  valid  statement.  Irrespective of  science 
telling us that rocks cannot be eternal,  this  would seem to spell  real  trouble for the 
argument  that  only an  eternal  universe  (contrast  to  a  finite  ex  nihilo universe)  can 
provide  an  answer  to  the  PEQ,  because  an  eternal  rock  would  represent  another 
logically valid option. Indeed, we could replace a rock with anything else we might care 
to invoke, and each woud be equally logically valid. However, whatever we replace an 
eternal universe with in the argument, it would still actually be one and the same with an 
eternal universe. That is, an eternal rock would actually be an eternal universe, and we 
see that an eternal universe would still be the only other option or counter example to a 
finite  ex nihilo universe. Of course, one could question if, like a rock, it is physically 
possible for the universe to be eternal. But while it may be meaningful to, the possible 
validity of the argument is unaffected because it is not dependant on whether an eternal 
universe is physically possible or not. Moreover, the argument is not concerned with 
what exists in the universe (this is where science comes in), but rather with showing 
logically that something, whatever it may be or how short lived, must  always remain 
physically existent. 
4.  Discussion
The  conclusion  that  the  universe  must  be  eternal  naturally  has  some  implications. 
Firstly, it would appear to preclude any cosmological model that posits that physical 
existence had a beginning a finite time in the past, whether that model have a finite or 
8 The argument can also be stated as follows: (1) The idea of an eternally existing universe not existing at  
some point during its eternal lifetime is contradictory; logically, such a universe cannot fail to exist and so  
would exist necessarily. (2) The existence of a universe which begins from nothing a finite time in the 
past is contingent. (3) The only way to satisfactorily answer the PEQ is with a necessary explanation. (4)  
Only an eternal universe (contrast to a universe which begins from nothing a finite time in the past) can 
answer the PEQ. (5) The PEQ must have an answer. (6) The universe must be eternal.
infinite future. As long as existence is not thought to actually “begin” at the big bang, 
however, such a conclusion is entirely compatible with big bang theory. It is the “before 
the big bang” that is the issue here, not the big bang itself. Not withstanding what the 
argument means for finite ex nihilo cosmological models, the idea of physical existence 
having a beginning a finite time in the past has another problem.  Irrespective of the 
concepts of time and space having no meaning before a so-called “beginning” due to 
there literally being nothing there (including clocks or rulers, real or theoretical), it is 
still valid to question what caused that beginning. But whatever physical event one may 
claim caused such a universe to exist, that event must have a cause too, as must that 
event, and so on, and so on, adfinitum. Because of this need for an infinite regress of 
prior causes, such a model inevitably results in impossible contradiction. Due to it being 
caused by the laws of physcs, note that this problem does not apply to the theory that 
our  universe  may  have  arisen  out  of  nothng  from a  gigantic  quantum fluctuation. 
However, as outlined eariler, rather that requiring an infinite regress of prior physical 
causes,  this  would require that the laws of physics exist  in  order  to cause quantum 
fluctuations, and apart from perhaps just in a platonic sense, they couldn't in such a 
situation. 
     However, the alternative option—that of the universe having an infinite past—is 
equally contradictory, for if the past were infinite with no beginning point from which 
the universe could begin to evolve from, it would be impossible for the universe to 
evolve to where we find ourselves today. Indeed, with an infinite past,  the universe 
could not evolve forward (in a manner of speaking) at all. After all, at any stage in the  
history of the universe, time would be infinite in the direction of the past. To better  
illustrate this point, it may help to imagine a ruler with one end being infinite in length 
and the other finite, and then ask how it would be possible to arrive at the finite end 
when coming from the infinite or opposite direction? Hopefully one will be able to see 
that this would be impossible. Or to put it yet another way; as an infinite cannot actually 
physically pertain, and a universe with a series of events stretching infinitely into the 
past  would  represent  an  infinite  actually  physically  pertaining,  the  past  cannot  be 
infinite.  It  might be contended that  with a  universe with an infinite past,  any event 
would still be a finite time in the past. While this is true, any event in the past would 
also have an infinite number of events preceding it! It is probably worth noting that this 
problem is also not dependant on time existing, as the same argument could be made by 
not referring to tense or the past, and instead simply referring to a numerical series of 
events. Thus, as with a universe with a finite past, any cosmological model that posits 
that  physical  existence  has  an  infinite  past  (for  example,  an  eternally  pre-existing 
quantum vacuum, eternal inflation [21], the  Steinhardt–Turok cyclic model [22]) also 
results in contradiction. 
     But this would all appear to present an impossible situation. How is there a universe 
when the seemingly two only options for its lifetime, finite or infinite, both result in 
contradiction? Moreover, what good is the main argument of this paper if the idea of an 
eternal universe is so clealy fundamentally flawed? However, there is actually a third, 
lesser-known option.  In  a  universe  in  which  time is  cyclic,  the  universe is  without 
beginning or end, exists eternally, and yet, in relation to time is also finite.9 I should 
note,  however,  that  if  one  perhaps  disagrees  with  the  fore-mentioned  cyclic  model 
(considering that it posits a closed universe, most at this point!10), or disagrees that there 
9 For more details, please see, P. Lynds, On a finite universe with no beginning or end, arXiv Preprint  
Server, arxiv:physics/0612053, (2006).
10 I should note that there are closed models in the literature that are consistent with current data [23],  
while I also don't see any reason why a flat universe should necessarily preclude a universe in which time  
was cyclic.
is a problem with the past stretching back infinitely, it does not matter in regard to the 
central (independent) argument of this paper. Indeed, if taken alone, the argument would 
compliment and support any model that posits an infinite past. 
     Before finishing, I should mention that the argument also has some significance for 
theology. With there being no place for a Creator in an eternally existing universe, and 
such a universe, of itself, already providing an answer to the PEQ, there can also be zero 
room for  theistic  explanations  for  why  the  universe  exists  rather  than  not.  As  the 
seeming  unanswerability  of  the  PEQ  by  any  conventional  means  has  represented 
something of a last  bastion for physical theology,  this  may not  go down very well. 
Indeed, some non-theists may also be disappointed by such an answer to the problem, 
for the unanswerability of the PEQ seems to add a certain mystery to existence, evoking 
a sense of wonder and awe in people. Because of this, some may prefer that it actually 
be unanswerable. I do not share this view. That we find a universe in which meaningful 
physical  questions,  even the deepest  ones,  all  seem to have meaningful,  naturalistic 
answers—a cosmos in which there is no need to appeal to supernatural explanations for 
why the world is the way it is—is, to me, a much better reason to feel a deep sense of  
wonder and awe when contemplating the nature of physical existence.
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